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COMMENT
HARMONIZATION OF SECURITIES MARKET REGULATIONS IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION: IS THE PRICE TAG Too HIGH?
INTRODUCTION
October 19, 1987, will long be remembered in the United States as
Black Monday.' On that date, the Dow Jones Industrial Average of New
York Stock Exchange listed securities fell 508 points2 on a record trading
volume of 604.3 million shares This drop constituted a one trillion-dollar,
or 22.6 percent loss in the market's value. The damage was not limited to
the U.S. markets alone, however. The ripple of the U.S. market loss affected
other exchanges and economies throughout the world.6
Europeans, for example, will never forget Black Monday as the day that
ignited the worst market panic since the post-war regeneration of European
industry.7 Coming off record highs, stock prices plummeted to a fraction of
their former values In the wake of the U.S. stock market crash, the stock
exchange in London lost 11 percent of its value, the Zurich Stock Exchange
lost 30 percent of its value, and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange lost 34 percent
of its value These losses were directly attributed to the U.S. stock market
crash.'" The events of Black Monday, and similar occurrences," underscore
1. See Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public
Policy Analysis, 57 FoRDtHAM L. REv. 191, 191 (1988).
2. See Tun Metz et al., Stocks Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,
1987, at 1. See also Jonathan R. Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange As a Firm" The
Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1007, 1007 (1990).
3. See Metz et al., supra note 2, at 1. See also Solomon & Dicker, supra note 1, at 191.
4. See Macey & Kanda, supra note 2, at 1007.
5. In comparison, the October 28, 1929, stock market crash that touched off the Great
Depression amounted to a 12.8 percent decline. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 1.
6. Similar market losses afflicted exchanges around the world. The Tokyo Stock Ex-
change was one of the first to reflect the impact of the U.S. market crash. See Macey &
Kanda, supra note 2.
7. See Terence Roth, European Stocks: Exchanges See Plans Ruined Across Europe in
Crash's Wake, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1988, available in 1988 WL-WSJ 479123.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Macey & Kanda, supra note 2, at 1007.
11. Additionally, the interdependence of world markets -was underscored in February
1995 with the collapse of Barings Plc, the British merchant bank, and again in June 1996 with
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the interdependency of the world financial markets. 2
The precipitation of such market interdependence now has world mar-
kets facing one of the most pressing and complicated economic problems of
our times. 3 International offerings of securities and international security
trading have increased dramatically over the course of the past fifteen
years. 4 As the world's capital markets struggle to meet the ever-increasing
demand for capital, 5 development of a comprehensive global securities
regulation plan is imminent. Such a plan would serve two objectives: (1)
enhancement of international economic good through capital formation; and
(2) avoidance of an international economic crisis." Thus far, the European
Union (EU) is the only international community to develop and begin to im-
plement such a comprehensive plan to harmonize security regulations."
In past years, 8 the fifteen member states of the EU 9 have implemented
far-reaching reforms covering a myriad of securities finance issues.2" These
detailed and phased reforms,2' implemented through a series of extensive
directives aimed at the promotion of greater competition between the states'
capital markets,22 also serve to provide a level playing field for cross-border
security offerings. 3 The reforms, both regulatory and deregulatory in na-
ture,2" have not come easily. EU member states currently are facing a threat
the Japanese Sumitomo Corporation reporting two billion dollars in copper-trading losses.
See Jane C. Kang, The Regulation of Global Futures Markets: Is Harmonization Possible or
Even Desirable?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 242, 242 (1996).
12. See Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the Internationalization of
the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, the European
Community, and Germany, 14 U. PA. J. INT'LBus. L. 565, 566 (1994).
13. See Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation, 23
DENV. J. INr'LL. & POL'Y 347, 417 (1995).
14. Id. at 347.
15. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 567.
16. See Wolff, supra note 13, at 417.
17. Id.
18. See Manning Gilbert Warren In, The European Union's Investment Services Direc-
tive, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 181, 181 (1994) [hereinafter Warren II, Directive].
19. Original member states of the EU consisted of France, West Germany, Italy, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, who joined together in 1957 under the Treaty of
Rome. Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom joined in 1973. Greece joined in 1979,
Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Sweden, and Finland joined in 1995. See Elena
Noel, Prevention of Gender Discrimination Within the European Union, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV.
77, 77-78 (1996).
20. See Giovanni Nardulli & Antonio Segni, EU Cross-Border Securities Offerings: An
Overview, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 887, 888-89 (1996).
21. See Warren I1, Directive, supra note 18, at 181.
22. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 597.
23. See Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at 900. See also Roquette, supra note 12, at
571-72.
24. Deregulation can refer to either the removal of restraints on competition or prudential
regulations, which are regulations designed to protect investors. See Roquette, supra note 12,
at 615.
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to their sovereignty 25 and forced cultural change as a price for harmonized
securities regulations.6 Such a price tag is proving to be too high for some
EU member states.27
This Comment assesses the probability of the EU's success in attempt-
ing to harmonize securities regulation requirements among its member
states. Successfully implementing securities market regulations in the EU, as
originally envisioned, carries a high cost in the way of threats to sovereignty
and forced cultural changes. Part I observes the historical perspective of EU
directives, taking special note of three significant directives in the field of
securities regulation. Part II addresses the present state of directive imple-
mentation, while Part III identifies the current shortcomings realized through
directive implementation. Part IV examines future events scheduled to move
the EU toward harmonization of securities regulation, and Part V concludes
by arguing that the price tag on harmonization of security regulations in the
European market system is too high for the EU's plan to succeed as origi-
nally envisioned.
I. EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVES
A. Historical Perspective
One of the principal objectives of the EU, since its inception in the
1950s, is the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital between
its member states' borders. 2' A barrier to achieving that objective is the EU's
lack of a uniform system of laws governing securities transactions." At pres-
ent, the EU is faced with a current system of diverse national rules and
regulations concerning the issuing and trading of securities on the EU's nu-
merous exchanges.3" Such conflicting regulatory systems erect barriers to
free trade and securities trading between member states.'
25. Although sovereignty has been defined in many ways, this article adopts the general
definition of Richard B. Bilder that sovereignty is "a state's right to do as it wishes, particu-
larly within its own territory, free of external constraint or interference." Richard B. Bilder,
Perspectives on Sovereignty in the Current Context: An American Viewpoint, 20 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 9, 10 (1994).
26. See infra Part V for a discussion of such threats.
27. Id
28. Within this broad objective, the EU is working to establish a capital market where
one EU country freely can list its securities on the trading exchange of another country. See
Mark S. Willis, A Brief Overview of the European Union's Efforts to Harmonize the Re-
quirements for Listing Securities, A.B.A. INT'L L. NEws, Fall 1997, at 1.
29. Unlike the U.S., the EU does not have a uniform system of securities regulations and
laws governing securities trading activity. Each member state independently supervises and
administers securities trading on its own exchange. See Narduli & Segni, supra note 20, at
887-88.
30. Id at 888.
31. Conflicting regulatory systems prohibit the free flow of capital between EU member
states by placing limitations on investors and trading practices through incompatible regula-
3
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The EU is currently attempting to remove the high, non-tariff barriers32
of conflicting regulatory requirements to provide greater flexibility and ac-
cess to the capital markets of the member states.3 Through a series of direc-
tives to member states,3 the EU has attempted to harmonize the security
regulation requirements of each member state by establishing minimum se-
curity information disclosure standards.35 Although the minimum standards
in most cases may not be lowered by a member state, the standards generally
can be raised. 6 Each member state must adopt these binding regulations into
legislation; however, each member state retains the choice as to the form and
method of implementation it wishes to employ to move the directive into
national law.37 Ultimately, the EU expects to achieve a minimum standard of
quality and accessibility in the securities markets by fostering a level of co-
operation among national supervisory bodies.38  Despite the EU's efforts,
however, the harmonization of securities regulations in the EU member
states has not yet achieved such a level of standardization.
B. Significant Directives
For over fifteen years, the EU has drafted and implemented a broaden-
ing number of increasingly-detailed directives in order to orchestrate the
harmonization of its member states' securities regulation requirements.39
Among these directives, three are most significant: (1) the Admissions Di-
rective; (2) the Interim Reports Directive; and (3) the Listing Particulars Di-
rective.4' Taken together, these three directives are commonly referred to as
the Stock Exchange Directives."
1. Admissions Directive
The Admissions Directive,42 adopted in 1979, established minimum
tory controls. See generally Roquette, supra note 12, at 588-89.
32. Non-tariff barriers consist primarily of regulatory statutes and controls. See Warren
E[[, Directive, supra note 18, at 186.
33. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 588-89.
34. See Willis, supra note 28, at 20.
35. See Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at 887-88.
36. Each individual state retains the discretion to add additional requirements to the
minimum standards set forth by the directives. See Willis, supra note 28, at 20-21.
37. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 588.
38. See generally Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at 888.
39. Construction of a supranational securities regulatory structure has evolved in phases
over the past fifteen years. See Warren II, Directive, supra note 18, at 181.
40. See Willis, supra note 28, at 20.
41. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 209 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Warren III, Global].
42. Council Directive 79/279, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21, amended by Council Directive
82/148, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22.
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 1 [1998], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol29/iss1/7
1998] HARMONIZATION OF SECURITIES MARKET REGULATIONS IN THE EU 225
common listing requirements for both debt43 and equity" securities that list 5
on EU members' stock exchanges.46 Additionally, this directive compels
corporations to report, in a timely fashion, all material information that may
affect the security's price. The aim of this directive is to ensure adequate
capitalization of offers and to determine that a market will exist for the secu-
rity after issuance. 8
A notable exception to this directive exists for Euro-securities. Euro-
securities are units underwritten49 by an agreement between the offeror and a
number of underwriters (of which the participants represent at least two EU
member states). Only banks or financial institutions can initially acquire
these units.0
The exclusion of Euro-securities from the Admissions Directive is due
to policy considerations, rather than regulatory considerations."' This exclu-
sion was created due to opposition from the Euro-securities industry,52 which
was attempting to prevent the placement of Euro-bonds on less regulated
global markets.53 Thus, the Euro-securities market has developed to a con-
siderable extent without regulatory control, despite its exemption from the
Admissions Directive.4
2. Interim Reports Directive
In 1982, the EU adopted the Interim Reports Directive.55 This directive
requires issuers of equity-related securities listed on member EU stock ex-
changes to file biannual reports56 of the company's activities for the subse-
quent six-month time period. 7 The report must indicate, in table form, both
43. Debt securities are promissory notes of a corporation, such as bonds. See NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE, NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GLOSSARY 4 (1992).
44. Equity securities are instruments which represent an ownership interest in the corpo-
ration, such as common and preferred stocks. See id. at 10.
45. The stock of a company that is traded on a securities exchange is referred to as a
listed security. Id at 16.
46. See Warren Ill, Directive, supra note 18, at 188.
47. See, e.g., Roquette, supra note 12, at 589.
48. See Willis, supra note 28, at 20.
49. Underwriting is the process of one or more investment bankers buying new issues of
stocks or bonds outright from a corporation and then forming a syndicate to sell the securities
to individuals and institutions. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 43, at 14.
50. See Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at 895-96.
51. Id at 895.
52. See Warren III, Global, supra note 41, at 229.
53. See Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at 896.
54. ld
55. Council Directive 82/121, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26, 27-28; see also Roquette, supra note
12, at 590; see Warren III, Global, supra note 41, at 214.
56. A formal financial statement showing assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, and
earnings of a corporation, as well as any other information that may be of interest to investors.
See NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 43, at 7.
57. See Warren III, Directive, supra note 18, at 188. See also Warren Em[, Global supra
5
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current financial figures and figures from the preceding financial year
showing, at minimum, the issuer's net asset turnover and the issuer's before-
tax profit or loss." An explanatory statement must also be included, indicat-
ing the company's business prospects for the remainder of the year,59 and
any relevant information concerning the company's activities." This report
must be published in a widely-distributed newspaper or made easily avail-
able to the public. Additionally, it must be conveyed to each member state
where the issue is listed.6' This notice requirement allows investors to make
informed appraisals of the security issue,62 thereby fulfilling the directive's
goal of investor protection.6'
3. The Listing Particulars Directive
The Listing Particulars Directive,6 adopted in 1980,65 protects investors
by providing sufficient information about a security and its issuer to enable
an investor to make an informed investment choice. 66 The directive attempts
to harmonize the vast array of the current disclosure requirements in the EU
by requiring publication of a detailed information sheet when: (1) an issuer
seeks to list an existing security on any member state exchange;6' or (2) the
security is listed concurrently with the public offering.69 This information
sheet must include the nature of the security (e.g., debt or equity), the issuer
of the security, the corporation's capital position, business activities" and
financial position, the officers and directors of the corporation, and the cor-
poration's recent developments, as well as current business prospects." Ad-
ditionally, the directive contains a broad provision requiring the disclosure
note 41, at 214.
58. See Willis, supra note 28, at 20.
59. See Warren II, Global, supra note 41, at 214-15.
60. Activities include any past, present, or future events that would allow the investor to
make informed decisions on the company's expected profits or losses. See Willis, supra note
28, at 20.
61. See Warren IMI, Global, supra note 41, at 215.
62- See Willis, supra note 28, at 20.
63. Regular, accurate, and consistent information is needed to achieve the goals of in-
vestor protection in securities trading. See Warren Im, Global, supra note 41, at 215.
64. Council Directive 80/390, 1980 O.J. (L100) 1, amended by Council Directive 90/211,
1990 O.J. (L 112) 24.
65. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 590.
66. Listing particulars are often referred to as a listing prospectus. See Willis, supra note
28, at 20.
67. See Wolff, supra note 13, at 372.
68. This requirement is intended to extend to all issuers, not just those incorporated in the
EU. See generally Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at 891.
69. See Willis, supra note 28, at 20.
70. Activities include all past, present, and future activities that may have an effect on
the company's overall profitability.
71. See Willis, supra note 28, at 20.
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of any information that may assist the investor in making an informed deci-
sion concerning the market risk of the security.72
The implementation of the Listing Particulars Directive, however,
should not be misconstrued as indicating that securities disclosure require-
ments in the EU are harmonized." While the directive sets minimum stan-
dards of information disclosure, it allows each member state to effect nu-
merous exceptions74 and impose its own penalties for issuer non-
compliance." The home country of the EU issuer generally is accepted as the
governing jurisdiction.76
Additionally, mere compliance with the directive does not guarantee
admission to listing.77 While the directive sets the minimum information dis-
closure requirements, each member state retains the freedom to establish its
own requisites for admission to listing." Also, note that the directive's re-
quirements are minimum requirements only; each member state has the
authority to add additional requirements beyond the standards set forth in the
directive. 9
The EU attempts to manage this disjointed system of security-listing re-
quirements through the principle of mutual recognition." Mutual recognition
allows an issuer to list the same security in any member state using the same
listing particulars form once the security is listed on another member state's
exchange." Mutual recognition applies even if the other member state has
more demanding disclosure requirements than the original listing member
state.82
It is important to note, however, that EU member states grant mutual
recognition only to the listing particulars form.83 Each time an issuer seeks to
list a security in a member state, it must comply with the admissions direc-
tive requirements of that member state.8
Thus, the Stock Exchange Directives do not completely harmonize se-
72. Id
73. Id
74. See Wolff, supra note 13, at 372.
75. See Willis, supra note 28, at 21.
76. In cases where the issuer is a non-EU member corporation, or the issue is directed at
non-EU member states, the issuer has the option of choosing the law of any jurisdiction in the
public offering to serve as the governing jurisdiction. See Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at
897.
77. Id at 892.
78. Requisites for admission are governed by national rules adopted in compliance with
other directives. Id.
79. See Willis, supra note 28, at 21.
80. Id; see also Roquette, supra note 12, at 592.
81. Listing must occur approximately within the same time period. See Willis, supra note
28, at 21.
82. Id
83. Id
84. Additionally, preplanning is of primary concern because benefits only will be reaped
from mutual recognition if listings occur within the same time period. Id
7
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curities regulation requirements in member states. Rather, the directives set a
minimum standard for compliance. 5 Domestic law in each member state
where listing is sought must still be consulted to determine any additional
requirements the state mandates above the directives' minimum require-
ments."6
II. PRESENT STATE OF DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION
Understanding the present state of the EU's securities regulation har-
monization efforts is helpful in assessing the progress that the Stock Ex-
change Directives have achieved thus far. While the national laws of EU
member states have undergone considerable change and member states are
closer to achieving harmonization of securities regulation requirements, only
moderate harmonization has occurred since the implementation of the direc-
tives. The EU markets are not integrated, as envisioned by EU proponents,
but remain in a fragmented state.88
One of the most demonstrable effects of the EU directives can be seen
in terms of information disclosure requirements. In particular, both Germany
and Switzerland, whose markets have traditionally been some of the most
unregulated markets in Europe, are progressively adding heightened disclo-
sure requirements to legislation.89 Initially, Germany did not find it necessary
to reform its capital markets and was reticent to do so." Succumbing to the
increasing competitive pressure placed on the German securities markets by
other EU member states' reforms, however, Germany felt global economic
pressure to make legislative reforms to match those of other member states.9'
Now Germany is a competitive player in the EU securities market despite its
initial slow start in making reforms.92
Furthermore, through the increased information disclosure levels of the
Stock Exchange Directives, the attitudes of many EU member market par-
85. Id
86. Id
87. It is important to note, however, that even the limited harmonization the EU member
states have achieved thus far is rare in the global marketplace. See Roquette, supra note 12, at
617.
88. See Warren Ill, Directive, supra note 18, at 219.
89. Heightened disclosure requirements are viewed as a tool to improve competitive
position within the global marketplace. See Nicholas G. Demmo, Comment, U.S. Securities
Regulations: The Need for Modification to Keep Pace with Globalization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 691, 717-18 (1996).
90. See Roquette, .supra note 12, at 613.
91. In addition to legislative reforms, Germany developed a new legal framework to
attract investors and to meet the developing standards of the international legal arena. Ger-
many also recognizes the importance of deregulation and is working to remove existing im-
pediments to its securities market, such as tax barriers. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 613-
14.
92. Id at 613.
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ticipants are beginning to change." EU firms now are looking to other mar-
kets, such as the United States, to list their securities."4 The increased levels
of information disclosure required by the EU now make it easier for EU
member countries to come to exchanges, such as the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE),95 which previously were impenetrable by most foreign issu-
ers due to the complexity and the high disclosure levels of foreign listing
requirements." Obviously, the greater the similarities between two different
countries' disclosure levels, the easier it is for one to list on the other's ex-
change.
97
Foreign stock exchanges, such as the NYSE, now are becoming so at-
tractive to EU companies that the companies are willing to undertake the
burden of complying with higher disclosure requirements.98 In fact, over one
thousand foreign companies, ranging from Daimler-Benz of Germany to
Toyota, Honda, and Nissan of Japan, now list on U.S. exchanges, despite the
needed reconciliations in accounting standards and the heightened regulation
by the Securities and Exchange Commission."
EU markets are also grappling with the technological advances that are
bringing the world markets closer.00 To remain competitive in the global
market, member states are compelled to allow the installation of hardware
and software in their territories to facilitate conducting business across bor-
ders.' ' Moreover, the issue of electronic transmission of stock quotes is
coming to the forefront."2 Unlike the U.S. securities markets' real-time re-
porting standards, the EU requires only the following constraints for quote
dissemination: (1) reporting at market opening the weighted average price
93. The U.S. market historically was viewed as impenetrable because of its characteristic
high disclosure requirements. Id at 618.
94. EU member states also have discussed and embarked on a number of projects fur-
thering the concept of a global marketplace. For example, the Federation of Stock Exchanges
in the EU created the Eurolist. The Eurolist is the equivalent of European "blue chip" stocks.
Another project concerns the development of a European stock index. Id. at 618-19.
95. Id at 618.
96. Id at 569.
97. Id at 619.
98. Much of the burden in complying with disclosure requirements of both the EU and
the U.S. comes by way of accounting standard discrepancies between the markets. The
Commission of the European Community and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
are working to narrow the gap in accounting practice differences through mutual recognition
and standardization efforts. As of now, the disclosure documents of U.S. issuers will almost
always be accepted'in the EU due to the U.S.'s heightened disclosure requirements. The re-
verse does not hold true, however, because the EU standards tend to fall below the U.S.
guidelines. Id. at 618-19.
99. See James Flanigan, Euro's Value Promises to Be More Than Monetary, L.A. TMES,
Feb. 1, 1998, at Dl, available in 1998 WL 2394140.
100. See Warren II, Directive, supra note 18, at 209.
101. The Investment Services Directive requires that investment firms be permitted to
become members of, or have access to, a state's regulated market via remote computer termi-
nals if the state's market does not require a physical trading floor. Id
102 Id at 215-16.
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and the preceding day's high and low price, along with the preceding day's
volume traded of each security; and (2) reporting the weighted average price
and high/low prices of each security every twenty minutes until market
closing (subject to a one hour reporting delay).'
Consequently, true harmonization of securities regulation requirements
in the EU is far from complete. While the EU markets are more closely har-
monized than in the past, challenges continue to plague their harmonization
efforts.
Ili. SHORTCOMINGS OF EU DIRECTIVES
Emerging financial markets are often faced with the lack of accounting
and compliance infrastructures necessary for successful operation of a com-
plex securities market."' This lack of harmonized accounting procedures and
regulatory policies is increasingly evident in the EU member states as the
implementation of further directives continues. Perhaps the most important
and difficult obstacle confronting the EU right now is the challenge to
maintain honesty and efficiency in a system that lacks absolute authority."'
While the directives do establish a minimum level of regulation, member
states are still free to adopt legislation that sets the regulatory bar higher.
Thus, the result is a wide variation in the degree of securities regulation from
one member state to another."6
A. Accounting Inconsistencies
Perhaps the most significant hurdle confronting the EU at present is the
varied system of accounting practices that each member state currently em-
ploys.' Not only do these inconsistencies in accounting practices result in
conflicting asset and liability valuations, but they als6 impede business ne-
gotiations and hamper the goal of information disclosure."'
For example, a unique historical German accounting standard is that of
profit smoothing.' Profit smoothing is the practice of under-reporting earn-
103. Reporting of the weighted average price and high/low price is based on a two-hour
calculation period. Id at 215.
104. See Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralismr Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism,
and Functionalism: A Comparison with Reference to Securities Regulation, 4 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CoNrEp. PROBS. 69, 83 (1994).
105. The measures necessary to achieve honesty and efficiency are different in each state
due to the varying market structures existing in the EU. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 568.
106. Id at 571.
107. See A. A. Sommer, Jr., IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 15, 23. See also Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at 890.
108. Reconciling financial statements and adapting to varied financial report disclosure
intervals can prove costly and burdensome on businesses wishing to raise capital in the EU.
See generally Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at 898.
109. See Demmo, supra note 89, at 710.
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ings in good years and using the reserve funds to bolster profits in poor or
mediocre years."' Thus, informed investors discount". the price of German
security offerings to compensate for unreported, hidden reserves.12  This
discounting is applied to all German companies, thereby negatively affecting
the stock price of those companies that do not engage in profit smoothing." 3
Therefore, the cost of capital in the German market is higher than it would
be in an efficiently-priced market."4
In addition to valuation inconsistencies, discrepant timing requirements
often hamper disclosure of financial information."5 For instance, the United
Kingdom and the United States require companies to file quarterly financial
reports, while Italian companies are required to file only biannual financial
reports."6 This timing inconsistency can greatly impede proposed business
transactions by delaying dissemination of information and increasing the
costs of compliance."7 Moreover, the cost associated with reconciling finan-
cial statements between EU countries impacts business negotiations"8 and
can erect non-tariff barriers by making prohibitive the cost of doing business
in the EU.
B. Regulatory Compliance
Securities market regulation, like accounting practices, varies widely
among the EU member states, running from sparse regulatory requirements
to comprehensive, complex systems."9 In most jurisdictions, the stock ex-
changes exert a great deal of authority over the regulation of the markets and
the determination as to whom those regulations apply.2 For instance, al-
though the primary goal of securities market regulation is customer protec-
tion, some jurisdictions afford less protection to professional or sophisticated
customers than they do to the average person.' 2' Consequently, the treatment
of investors between exchanges is uncertain.
110. Id
111. Discounting is a practice by which a stock or a bond is sold below par value. See
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 43, at 9.
112. See Demmo, supra note 89, at 710.
113. Id
114. Id
115. See Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at 898.
116. Id
117. Financial reports and accounting statements need to be reconciled to various EU
accounting practices for each business transaction. This process can be impeded greatly by
the differing schedules at which financial data is released in each EU state. Id.
118. Id
119. See Peter E. Millspaugh, Global Securities Trading: The Question of a Watchdog,
26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 355, 359-60 (1992).
120. See Kang, supra note 11, at 251.
121. The reasoning behind this is the belief that such customers can make more informed
assessments of risk. Id at 248-49.
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Contributing to this regulatory uncertainty is the fact that not all security
markets are the same.' As reflections of varying political, cultural, and
commercial structures, securities markets generally fall within three catego-
ries: (1) markets created through private exchanges (such as in the United
States); (2) markets owned and operated by the state (such as in France); and
(3) markets owned and controlled by central banks (such as in West Ger-
many).' Therefore, closer cooperation between the diverse regulatory bod-
ies that currently comprise the international securities market is essential for
the efficient allocation of capital and for sustained economic growth activity
in the EU.24
Further evidence of the need for regulatory compliance among the EU
member states is found in the mounting involvement of organized crime in
securities theft and the surge in international securities trading." In the
1980s alone, capital investments increased threefold globally, and the value
of international equity trading increased tenfold.'26 Nevertheless, regulatory
control has not kept pace,'2 and the EU is now facing a regulatory crisis
characterized by a climate of extreme diversity and a fluctuating economic
environment.'2
IV. FUTURE EVENTS MOVING TOWARD HARMONIZATION
The future success of the harmonization of securities regulation between
EU member states is dependent upon the members' ability to lay a solid
foundation of efficiency and honesty in the markets."' In particular, three
movements are currently underway that are vital to the success of the EU's
harmonization plan: (1) the implementation of a centralized regulatory
authority; (2) the introduction of the Euro as a single European currency; and
(3) the acceptance of international accounting standards.
A. A Centralized Regulatory Authority
The need for regulatory integration of securities markets is not as self-
evident in any other market system as it is in the EU market system."' If the
122. World stock exchange markets differ in terms of trade clearance and settlement
systems, access to information, and economies. See Millspaugh, supra note 119, at 359.
123. Id
124. See Sommer, Jr., supra note 107, at 26-27.
125. See Millspaugh, supra note 119, at 358.
126. Stock exchanges in London, Amsterdam, Paris, Zurich, and the NASDAQ in the
U.S. each list over 200 foreign securities. Id. at 356-57.
127. For example, in 1992 the SEC employed 2600 regulators while the Japanese mar-
kets employed approximately 200. Id at 359-60.
128. Id at 359.
129. See Sommer, Jr., supra note 107, at 28-29.
130. Greater efficiency and liquidity would result through economies of scale achieved
by a unified financial market. See Warren I, Directive, supra note 18, at 191.
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EU member states' markets were combined into one cohesive unit, they
would form a market rivaling that of the NYSE.' However, no formal, cen-
tralized, regulatory authority currently exists in EU securities markets.'
The nearest entity approximating a formal, centralized regulatory
authority in the EU is the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO)."' In recent years, IOSCO has studied enforcement coopera-
tion between the EU member state exchanges34 and currently serves as the
principal forum for discussions of international securities issues."' Despite
speculation, IOSCO's agenda has not indicated an intent to assume the role
of a global securities watchdog.'36 IOSCO, and similar organizations,'37 are
special-interest groups with a narrow focus, lacking both the objectivity and
credibility to serve effectively as an international regulatory authority.'38 Ad-
ditionally, IOSCO lacks mandate authority to adopt and implement binding
international regulatory principles.'39
The EU is not blind to the need for an international regulatory body,
however. The EU member states are examining a proposal to create a Secu-
rities Committee charged with the roles of both a general discussion forum
and a securities regulatory committee. 4 ' The Committee would be responsi-
ble for examining questions relevant to the application of EU provisions
concerning securities, securities markets, and securities intermediaries.'
4
The Committee would not consider issues relating to individual cases, how-
ever.142 Thus, despite the lack of regulatory cohesiveness between EU mar-
kets, the extent of securities regulation harmonization achieved thus far is
serving as a catalyst for the formation of a securities regulatory committee. 
41
131. Id
132. An independent, disinterested organization does not currently exist that holds the
expertise and authority to function as an international securities watchdog. See Millspaugh,
supra note 119, at 374.
133. In 1974, nations of the Western Hemisphere, largely under the leadership of the
U.S., created the InterAmerican Association of Securities Commissions as a forum for com-
mon interest securities regulation issues and capital asset formation issues. By 1983, the or-
ganization had taken on a world-wide stature. By 1987, the organization had transformed
itself into the International Organization of Securities Commissions and was recognized in the
world securities markets as IOSCO. See Sommer, Jr., supra note 107, at 15.
134. See Millspaugh, supra note 119, at 365.
135. See Wolff, supra note 13, at 399-400.
136. See Millspaugh, supra note 119, at 371.
137. Similar organizations include the North American Securities Administrators Asso-
ciation (NASAA), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
and the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV). Id. at 365-67.
138. Id at 373-74.
139. See Wolff, supra note 13, at 399.
140. See Proposal for Securities Committee is Amended, EUR. UNION FIN. INDUS.
MoNrrOR, Aug. 1, 1996, at 6, available in 1996 WL 10485798.
141. Id
142. Id
143. See Warren EII, Directive, supra note 18, at 220.
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B. Introduction of the Euro
January 1, 1999, marks the official introduction of the Eurodt to the
European Community. 45 This massive attempt to create a single European
currency, and thus harmonize the economic markets of Europe, will culmi-
nate in the year 2002 when the Euro is scheduled to replace the varied cur-
rencies that currently exist throughout Europe.1
6
Despite the potential economic gains' 47 that stand to be achieved by a
common European currency, the introduction of the Euro is being referred to
as "the biggest currency crapshoot the world has known.' '148 Indeed, not all
countries are participating in the Euro. Thus far, Britain and Denmark have
declined participation because economic conditions presently are not suit-
able. 149 Further, four economic and monetary experts lodged a complaint
with Germany's Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe attempting to stop the
scheduled introduction of the Euro, asserting that the stability of the Euro
can not be guaranteed.'50 This was the fourth such complaint lodged with the
Constitutional Court against the Euro.'5' Nevertheless, introduction of the
Euro remained scheduled for January 1999. ' 52
The impact of the Euro on European economic markets will be tremen-
dous. The aggregate of stocks, bonds, and bank deposits of the fifteen EU
countries currently totals $27 trillion, compared to $23 trillion in the United
States.'53 One market watcher predicts that such a massive undertaking as the
introduction of the Euro will have a negative impact on the current European
securities markets.'54 He predicts the emergence of a "Euro-zone" of power,
144. The Euro is a single monetary unit proposed by the European Monetary Union. If
the introduction of the Euro is successful, a unified capital market should result which will
provide European individuals and businesses with the financial capabilities found in the U.S.
See Flanigan, supra note 99.
145. See Countdown to the Euro, EuR. REp., Jan. 14, 1998, at 1, available in WL
8799947 [hereinafter Countdown].
146. See Douglas Lavin, WSJ: Spending Money to Sell the Euro, Dow JONES NEWS
SERV., Nov. 25, 1997, at 00:05:00.
147. The introduction of the Euro has the potential to create the single largest global
financial marketplace. This single European financial market will benefit Europe's people
and businesses in much the same way the U.S. economy benefits its citizens and businesses.
For example, the abundance of mortgage money will encourage home ownership, and fi-
nancing will be more readily available to European businesses that wish to expand. See Flani-
gan, supra note 99, at Dl.
148. See Lavin, supra note 146.
149. See Flanigan, supra note 99, at Dl.
150. See Countdown, supra note 145.
151. Id
152. See Flanigan, supra note 99, at Dl.
153. Id
154. An equities strategist with a major U.S. brokerage firm in London predicts compe-
tition between the individual European stock exchanges. See Robb M. Stewart, Euro Might
Prompt Stock Trading to Shift Toward Euro-Zone, Dow JoNes INT'L NEws SERV., Dec. 17,
1997, at 03:31:00.
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consisting of the security exchanges in Germany, France, and Switzerland.'
This "Euro-zone" power triangle is expected to challenge London and other
smaller exchanges'56 by heightening competition and diverting investments
away from non-Euro exchanges.'57 The first signs of this "Euro-zone" power
center are emerging, as German, French, and Swiss exchanges are already
jointly working to create an electronic link-up between security trading sys-
tems.'
58
Electronic link-ups and technology will play an important role in the se-
curities markets with the introduction of the Euro. From an investor's per-
spective, the Euro will create a "common market"'59 by concentrating the
delivery of numerous markets through system networks.6 ' Accordingly, only
those brokers with access to the best technology will be able to compete suc-
cessfully, thereby challenging both the local markets and brokers not geared
to meet the technological challenge.' 6' It is important to remember, however,
that while technology may create the facade of a common market, individual
European exchanges will still be.subject to the control and administration of
the individual member state in which they operate.'62
C. Acceptance of International Accounting Standards
At the heart of many of the issues encountered in the harmonization of
securities regulation has been the diverse accounting practices employed
throughout the*EU member states. In particular, the preparation of disclosure
documents is burdensome due to the lack of universally accepted accounting
practices."' Thus, IOSCO has urged the development and acceptance of in-
ternationally accepted accounting and auditing standards."
Harmonization of accounting standards and practices is currently an is-
sue of discussion in the world economic markets'65 as the movement to de-
velop international standards pushes forward. Even the SEC, with some of
155. Id
156. Denmark, Greece, and Sweden are exchanges expected to suffer at the hands of the
"Euro-zone" power triangle. Id
157. Id
158. Id
159. After the introduction of the Euro, the securities markets will appear as one because
all securities will trade in the same denomination (the Euro) and the location of brokers will
be of minimal importance with the advance of computerized trading. See Brendan McGrath,
Stock Exchange Predicts 10 New Listings, IR. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1998, at 16, available in 1998
WL 6221454.
160. Id
161. Id
162. See Willis, supra note 28, at 21.
163. See generally Wolff, supra note 13, at 402.
164. Id
165. Organizations such as IOSCO are discussing and reviewing proposals for the har-
monization of accounting and auditing standards. See Nardulli & Segni, supra note 20, at
898.
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the strictest exchange requirements in the world, has demonstrated support
by accepting cash flow statements prepared according to International Ac-
counting Standards currently in existence and not requiring that the state-
ments conform to U.S. GAAP.'66 Yet, many hurdles exist to establishing an
accepted, comprehensive system.
The developed standards will need to be flexible enough to support
variations resulting from peculiarities in legal, tax, and regulatory structure;
differing economic environments; and circumstances unique to specific
countries."6 Additionally, the standards developed will be open to questions
of interpretation.'68 Despite these hurdles, the EU appears committed to de-
veloping and implementing international accounting standards.
V. SUCCESS AS ENVISIONED UNLIKELY
Further securities law harmonization beyond the scope of the current
EU endeavors seems improbable,,'69 and total integration of the EU markets,
as originally envisioned by EU advocates, appears unattainable. While
commentators generally agree that minimum standards of regulation must be
implemented to ensure honesty within the market place, they often disagree
on what constitutes those minimum standards.7 ' At this juncture in the har-
monization process, it appears future progress can result only from contin-
ued deregulation of the EU markets;' however, continued deregulation is
not a prospect that is attractive to many EU member states.
Indeed, it is becoming apparent that the EU member states chose "har-
mony now at the price of discord later,' '. with the signs of discord begin-
ning to reveal themselves. The EU harmonization process, although swift,
has resulted in a series of weak "minimum standard" securities regulations
with no effective mechanism in place to coordinate or enforce the regula-
tions."' Different cultures of regulation currently exist in the EU member
states; 74 there are no universal trade clearance or settlement'75 mechanisms in
166. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. See Wolff, supra note 13, at 403.
167. Any standards developed will be subject to variations encountered at local levels.
These standards must be flexible enough to maintain their credibility and uniformity, yet be
functional, taking into account any local variations. See David Mercado, Evolving Account-
ing Standards in the International Markets, 961 PLI/CoRP 343, 348 (1996).
168. Systems for interpreting standards are being developed. Id. at 349.
169. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 620.
170. Id. at 621.
171. Id at 620.
172. See Warren lII, Global, supra note 41, at 231; Roquette, supra note 12, at 597.
173. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 597-98.
174. Id at 620.
175. A trade concludes, or settles, when a customer pays the broker/dealer for the securi-
ties purchased or delivers the securities sold and receives from the broker/dealer the proceeds
from the sale. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 43, at 25.
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place; 76 and there seems to be no regulatory commission in the foreseeable
future.'" Without continued deregulation of the securities laws to ignite fur-
ther movement toward harmonization, success as envisioned for the EU se-
curities markets will be unattainable.178 Therefore, the question becomes one
of how high a price the EU member states are willing to pay to achieve the
desired goal of harmonization.
Two significant impediments stand in the way of further securities mar-
ket deregulation in the EU: (1) the threat to the political sovereignty of the
individual EU nations; and (2) a resistance to forced cultural changes within
the EU.
A. Threat to Sovereignty
The creation of an international regulatory body is a natural and neces-
sary development of the securities regulation harmonization process in the
EU. 79 To create such a regulatory body, however, the EU member states
must be willing to relinquish their sovereign authority over their market.'
This is a price many independent EU nations are disinclined or hesitant to
pay.
Indications of a desire to maintain a sense of sovereignty over their own
economic markets are already beginning to emerge. For example, two EU
member states, the United Kingdom 8' and Denmark, have thus far de-
clined to participate in the upcoming implementation of the Euro.'83 Britain,
for instance, maintains that economic conditions presently are not suitable
for the implementation of the Euro into its economy." Although Britain one
day plans to introduce the Euro, for the present time it is exercising its po-
litical sovereignty and declining to participate.'85
Such "in or out" approaches to securities deregulation are not as sim-
plistic as they may seem, however. Decisions are further complicated when
proposed reforms come in the form of an EU directive because each member
state is bound to adopt the directive into legislation.8 6 Thus, to remain a
member state, compliance with EU directives is required.
Furthermore, whether reforms come by way of an EU directive or not,
EU member states often feel compelled to implement the reforms to remain
176. See Warren III, Directive, supra note 18, at 210.
177. Ia at 219.
178. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 620-21.
179. See supra Part Ill.
180. See Millspaugh, supra note 119, at 374-75.
181. See Countdown, supra note 145.
182. See supra Part IV. B.
183. See Flanigan, supra note 99, at DI.
184. See Countdown, supra note 145.
185. Id
186. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 587-88.
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competitive, regardless of whether they agree with the substance of the re-
form. Through deference to and cooperation with emerging reforms, EU
member states seek to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade" and maintain an
air of collective participation. These efforts, in turn, allow the member state
to remain competitive in the global market place.
Conversely, declining to participate in reforms is also a tool EU coun-
tries are using to maintain competitiveness.'88 The price of a competitive
market need not come by way of relinquishing political sovereignty. By
adopting only the minimum standards of EU directives or refusing to adopt
certain reforms, a country can effectively gain a competitive advantage
through lax regulation.'89 As EU directives become more restrictive, this lax
approach to reform implementation is likely to become more common.
Increasingly, EU member governments are feeling the pressure to resign
themselves to the role of business advocates instead of the governmental role
they traditionally enjoyed.' Yet, the role of business advocate is not one all
governments are adopting with open arms, as evidenced by Britain and
Denmark's decision to decline participation in the implementation of the
Euro.' There is a continued reluctance to relinquish complete sovereignty of
economic markets.
Release of governmental control over economic markets is a precursor
to the implementation of a harmonized securities market. Such a release of
control by all EU member states, however, would require inconceivable
diplomatic efforts and is extremely improbable, short of a market collapse or
an event of extreme political embarrassment to demand such a change. 2
Thus, the threats to political sovereignty seem to be an insurmountable hur-
dle to achieving complete securities harmonization in the EU.
B. Resistance to Forced Cultural Change
In addition to a reluctance to relinquish political sovereignty, EU mem-
ber states also cling to their cultural sovereignty. The race to achieve har-
monization of the EU securities markets has affected both social and cultural
concerns; however, the gains achieved toward economic good may not be
high enough to sacrifice cultural mores.
A member state may decline to implement reforms initiated by another
187. See Trachtman, supra note 104, at 81. Examples of non-tariff barriers include taxes,
admission and registration requirements, and securities regulation statutes.
188. Ide at 116.
189. A lack of policy and laws may foster an environment where countries can find
common ground and agreement when conflicting standards between the countries threaten
trade. Id
190. Governments all over the world are finding themselves in the business of promoting
the private sector. Id
191. See supra Part IV.B.
192. See Millspaugh, supra note 119, at 374-75.
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state if it views such reforms as threatening to the state's cultural sovereignty
or as acts of aggressive unilateralism.'93 For example, the heightened securi-
ties disclosure levels advocated by the EU are expected to create a new cor-
porate psychology within EU corporations that did not exist in the past.'94
This new corporate psychology may be viewed by some as threatening to the
state's business culture.
The EU is comprised of states having diverse historical events responsi-
ble for shaping each into a unique social and cultural entity. This sudden
race toward the harmonization of securities markets may be viewed by states
as an ethnocentric attempt to require everyone to follow the same path and
compromise the heritage of the state in the process.'
One example of the effects EU directives can have on both the political
and cultural sovereignty of a nation is found in Ireland. Ireland's status as an
EU member state has given the nation substantial economic benefits, yet
these benefits have not come without social cost.' 96 The political and cultural
landscape of Ireland is changing forevermore as Ireland loses its struggle to
maintain complete sovereignty.
The Roman Catholic Church has wielded immense power in Ireland.
Since the nation's membership to the EU in 1973, however, this power has
slowly waned.' Focusing on the economic benefits of EU membership,
Irish politicians demonstrated a willingness to set aside canonical law in fa-
vor of EU law to show the compatibility of Ireland's government with the
EU. 99 A prime example of the fading Roman Catholic Church's influence
came in May 1995 when the Supreme Court of Ireland upheld the Regula-
tion of Information Bill."' This bill, in essence, protected the right of a
woman to receive information on abortion procedures offered abroad.20'
This decision directly contravened prior Supreme Court holdings0 2 and Ro-
193. See Trachtman, supra note 104, at 83.
194. This new corporate psychology may develop as a result of management's aspiration
to develop a global image. See Roquette, supra note 12, at 598.
195. Countries may resist harmonization attempts to protect their sense of cultural sover-
eignty. See Trachtman, supra note 104, at 83.
196. See David O'Connor, Note, Limiting "Public Morality" Exceptions to Free Move-
ment in Europe: Ireland's Role in a Changing European Union, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 695,
695 (1997).
197. Id, at 696.
198. It should be noted that there has not been a complete separation of church and state,
however. The preamble of Ireland's Constitution still contains references to the "Holy Trin-
ity" and "our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ." Id. at 711-13, citing IR. CONST. PREAMBLE.
199. Politicians of the time knew that acceptance into the EU was critical for Ireland.
Once acceptance was achieved, the politicians expected a windfall of economic benefits to
follow. Id. at 712.
200. This bill codified the wording of the fourteenth amendment protecting a woman's
right to information concerning abortion services offered in other EU states. The decision to
uphold this bill is regarded as one of the most important modem Irish court decisions. Id. at
707-08.
201. Id at 708.
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man Catholic teachings, with many viewing the decision as an indication
that the Irish Court is attempting to appease other member states."3 Further
complicating matters in the EU is the Treaty on the European Union,
204
which has the dual goal of achieving both monetary and political harmoni-
zation of EU member states.00
Thus, the EU has the power to influence member states indirectly by in-
truding into matters of political and cultural sovereignty.0 6 This power is not
going unnoticed, as member states are beginning to realize the price tag at-
tached to harmonizing securities regulations may be too high.
CONCLUSION
The goal of EU securities regulation harmonization efforts is to create
an integrated securities market that will enhance the international economic
good and avoid an economic crisis. 2' Through a series of directives, the EU
member states have moved closer to achieving such a goal; however, much
needs to be accomplished in narrowing accounting inconsistencies between
states and establishing an effective EU securities regulatory body.
The world is becoming a smaller place in which to do business. Coun-
tries are developing at a feverish pace as the attractiveness of doing business
beyond home borders continues to grow. This is especially true in terms of
securities trading. Immeasurable untapped wealth exists in foreign capital
markets and the key to tapping that wealth lies in harmonization.
Despite the steps the EU has taken thus far, complete harmonization, as
envisioned by EU advocates, is likely unattainable. The harmonization of
security listing requirements has not been a smooth road to travel. Both the
lack of a global regulatory commission and the difficulties surrounding the
introduction a single European currency have plagued the efforts of the EU.
To achieve complete harmonization of securities regulations in the EU,
the member states must be willing to sacrifice both political and cultural in-
dependence in favor of economic reform, a step many EU countries are un-
willing to take. Threats to political and cultural sovereignty have forced
many EU member states to proceed with harmonization cautiously and to
protect their own interests. Additionally, many member states are finding
non-compliance with the EU directives to be a competitive advantage as
well.
202. The Irish Supreme Court had been extremely conservative in its decisions and it
was expected the Regulation of Information Bill was certain to be struck down. Id.
203. Id at 709-10.
204. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1693 (entered into force Nov. 1,
1993). This treaty is viewed as a move toward unifying the treatment of public morality is-
sues by EU member states. O'Connor, supra note 196, at 709-10.
205. O'Connor, supra note 196, at 727.
206. Id at 713-14.
207. See Wolff, supra note 13, at 417.
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The current level of harmonization already attained in the EU securities
markets is a big step, however, and should not be discounted."8 EU securities
markets are more attractive now than they have been at any time in the
past,0 9 yet the present price tag on reaching complete harmonization appears
too high.
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